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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION N		
10/072,525 02/05/2002 Karla Robotti		10011206	2898		
	7590 06/16/200 CHNOLOGIES INC.	EXAMINER			
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ADMINISTRATION,LEGAL DEPT. MS BLDG. E P.O. BOX 7599			NGUYEN, QUANG		
MS BLDG. E P LOVELAND, (ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER		
			1633		
		NOTIFICATION DATE	DELIVERY MODE		
			06/16/2008	ELECTRONIC	

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es):

IPOPS.LEGAL@agilent.com

Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)		
10/072,525	ROBOTTI, KARLA		
Examiner	Art Unit		
QUANG NGUYEN, Ph.D.	1633		

	QUANG NGUYEN, Ph.D.	1633	
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the	correspondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED <u>19 May 2008</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS APP	LICATION IN CONDITION FOR A	LLOWANCE.	
1. The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on application, applicant must timely file one of the following application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appel for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 C periods:	the same day as filing a Notice of replies: (1) an amendment, affidaveal (with appeal fee) in compliance	Appeal. To avoid abar it, or other evidence, w with 37 CFR 41.31; or	hich places the (3) a Request
a) The period for reply expires 2 months from the mailing date	of the final rejection.		
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire to Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(ater than SIX MONTHS from the mailin b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE f).	g date of the final rejection FIRST REPLY WAS FIL	n. .ED WITHIN TWO
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extunder 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL	ension and the corresponding amount hortened statutory period for reply orig than three months after the mailing da	of the fee. The appropria inally set in the final Offic	te extension fee e action; or (2) as
 The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exter Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed water Notice of Appeal has been filed. 	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the	
3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, b	out prior to the date of filing a brief.	will not be entered be	cause
(a) They raise new issues that would require further cor			
(b) ☐ They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE belo			
(c) ☐ They are not deemed to place the application in bet appeal; and/or	ter form for appeal by materially re	ducing or simplifying th	ne issues for
(d) ☐ They present additional claims without canceling a	corresponding number of finally rej	ected claims.	
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).			
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.12		mpliant Amendment (F	PTOL-324).
5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):		Caral Clad and an andress	(P (b -
 Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be all non-allowable claim(s). 			
7. For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) how the new or amended claims would be rejected is proved the status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to:		ll be entered and an ex	planation of
Claim(s) rejected: <u>1-3,9,15-21,24,26-42,44-56,58 and 59</u> . Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:			
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE			
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, bu because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e). 			
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to o showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary 	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under apper and was not earlier presented. S	al and/or appellant fails ee 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1)	s to provide a
10. The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation	n of the status of the claims after e	ntry is below or attache	ed.
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER 11. ☑ The request for reconsideration has been considered bu	t does NOT place the application is	n condition for allowan	ce because:
See Continuation Sheet.		1 condition for alloward	de pecause.
12.	PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)		
	/QUANG NGUYEN, PI	n D /	
	Primary Examiner, Art U		

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: Applicant's arguments are respectfully found not persuasive for overcoming the rejections of record.

1. It is noted that on pages 10-12 of the Ater-Final amendment, Applicant simply presented essentially the same arguments for which they were already addressed in the Final office action mailed on 3/18/08 (at least pages 9-12). With respect to the Avnir reference (US 6,159,453), Applicant further argues that there is no reason whatsoever for one skilled in the art of microanalysis to turn to a lotion for protecting skin, hair and nails for the ravages of UV radiation in an effort to address shortcomings and deficiencies of known microanalytical devices and methods at the time of Applicant's invention.

Once again, it appears that Applicant only considers the teachings of Avnir reference (US 6,159,453) in total isolation from the teachings of other cited references. The Avnir reference clearly indicated that at the time of Applicant's invention, doped sol-gel particulates or powder in any shape with 0.01-100 microns in diameters were successfully made and used. In the overall context of the rejection of record, it would have been obvious for an ordinary skilled artisan to make and use doped sol-gel particulates or powder of 0.01-100 microns in forming a micro-analytical device for use in sensor, waveguide and integrated optics applications and/or analysis of small and/or macromolecular and/or other solutes in the liquid phase because Dunn et al already taught that encapsulated biological material prepared by the sol-gel process is easier to minaturize and less cumbersome for use in analytical devices of very high sensitivity; biological material embedded in a sol gel used as a component of micron-scale devices was also disclosed by Lochhead et al. Furthermore, Avnir (US 5,300,564) already taught that crushed powder doped sol-gel glasses can be used as support for enzymatic column chromatography.

2. Applicant's representative further argues that he is unaware of any standard that relies on a totality of the teachings' standard.

Please note that the rejections of record for determining obvious under 35 USC 103(a) were based on factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 US.1, 148 USPQ 459 (1996).

3. Once again, Applicant argues that there is no suggestion to combine the teachings of the applied art other than the use of Applicant's invention as a template for its own reconstruction, and therefore the rejection for obviousness is improper.

Please see the motivations already set forth in the rejections of record. Additionally, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).